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The future role of natural gas in the European energy system is highly uncertain. Several 
scenarios, however, anticipate an increase of import dependence up to 80% by 2030. 
Notwithstanding such anticipation, a European approach to ensuring gas security of supply 
within the EU has not been achieved yet.  
 
While the internal market is key to deliver security of gas supply, additional, new instruments 
addressing short- and long-term security of supply have been introduced recently at EU 
level. These include for instance the European Energy Infrastructure Package or the 
Regulation (EU) No 994/2010.  
 
Today, security of energy supply as a goal in itself is not only enshrined in the European 
Treaties. Rather, it is also addressed directly and indirectly by various hard and soft law 
measures that tackle it from several complementary angles. In 2011 the Commission 
eventually presented the long awaited Communication on the external dimension of energy 
policy, which identified ways to reinforce the efficiency of EU policies with regard to the 
external energy relations. However, judging from the lessons learned during past supply 
crises and the results obtained so far, one may ask whether the current architecture on which 
the EU gas security of supply policy is built is able to deliver those responses needed in 
order to meet the growing risks and changing realities EU gas security faces? How should 
institutions and regulation adapt and respond? And, is the EU on the right track to meet its 
stated objective – the European supply security policy? 
 
The Clingendael International Energy Programme (CIEP), together with the Fondazione 
Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), the Loyola de Palacio Chair at the Robert Schuman Centre of 
Advanced Studies, European University Institute (EUI) and Wilton Park have organized a 
series of workshops in order to take stock and discuss a possible new architecture for EU 
gas security. Discussions and reflections reported from the workshops held under this 
project have developed into the following concluding ideas and recommendations for a new 
EU gas security of supply architecture.1 
  
 
                                                   
1 The deliberations at the four workshops greatly informed the views expressed in this policy brief, but those views belong to the authors only and do not necessarily represent those of individual participants at the 




Secure and reliable external supply flows to EU markets 
 
Assessing security in the supply/demand balance requires a clear view on the EU’s market 
needs. Security of demand is a prerequisite for security of supply and vice versa. Although high 
levels of uncertainty will have to be recognized, it is expected that natural gas will continue 
to play an important - and even increasing - role in the EU fuel mix for the decades to come. 
While natural gas was considered to be the “fuel of choice” for some time, it could become the 
“fuel of consequence” especially where alternatives for gas in power generation are facing 
specific problems of their own. The EU’s developing gas demand in the medium and longer 
terms is largely based on the role that market participants are seeing for this fuel in the 
overall energy mix. This role is broadly based on the energy policies that the EU and the 
Member States are defining and implementing and the way in which market parties are 
applying and implementing the use of gas and the resulting demand.  
 
Energy demand, gas demand and the demand for other energy fuels and sources are basically 
long-term issues. Accordingly is the policy basis. While the EU has agreed on an energy 
policy framework for the period up to 2020, policies for the period beyond 2020 are still 
under consideration. It would be very useful to approach these policies and the resulting role 
for gas with the view in mind of giving the levels of demand security that would help 
suppliers to offer the required levels of supply security. In that context, the “golden age for 
gas” as predicted globally by the International Energy Agency (IEA) could emerge also for 
the EU. For this to happen, two main conditions need to be taken into account: the 
development of a clear signal from the EU on its needs for gas and the further deployment 
of cost effective means for capturing and storing carbon emissions. 
 
Another issue which over the last years has transformed global gas markets and will continue 
playing an increasingly important role is shale gas. In fact, over the last few years shale gas 
has experienced in the US a massive development representing today about two thirds of the 
country's domestic gas production. This "shale gas revolution" has radically changed the 
global natural gas environment with impacts also for Europe as important new Liquefied 
Natural Gas (LNG) supplies originally destined to the US market have reached North-West 
Europe therefore uncoupling spot gas prices from long-term oil indexed gas prices. Due to 
the shale gas development, gas prices in the US have dramatically fallen over the last years. 
This new environment provides today great expectations among American leaders for a new 
American industrial and economic renaissance. Several LNG export projects have been 
proposed in the US to take advantage of the important price differential with Europe (three 
to four times higher) and Asia (six-seven times higher). However, there are strong political 
hurdles for significant US LNG export quantities as this would increase the domestic gas 
prices. We therefore do not expect important LNG supplies from the US to Europe. With 
regard to the European domestic dimension, there is presently no production of shale gas in 
Europe. Poland and France are thought to have large shale-gas resources (together with 
Norway, Ukraine, Sweden, Denmark and the United Kingdom). However, developing most 
of these resources appears to be problematic in the EU due to environmental and regulatory 
issues as well as missing public acceptance. In fact, some European countries like France 
have for the time being banned shale gas production. There may be some potential in 
Poland due to the country's strong willingness to become more independent from Russian 
gas.   
 
Assessing the major existing and potential external supply sources for the EU, Norway, 
Russia, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)-region and the Caspian Basin are the 
determinant factors for the EU’s gas security of supply chessboard.   
 
Norway has always been a reliable supplier, but some concerns are emerging about its 
longer-term supply capabilities. Significant gas discoveries have not been done in the last 
decade and different studies are indicating a production peak around 2020.  
 
Russia, the largest resource holder in the world, will continue to be the EU’s main external 
supply source. The EU and Russia have on this point an intractable interdependency. Hence 
the EU-Russia Energy dialogue (or any other appropriate instrument) should remain and be 
further developed as a fundamental aspect of any EU gas supply security architecture. 
Energy supply and demand strategies, developing upstream potentials, coordination of R&D 
in relation to supply and transportation, policy discussions on market designs and business 
models are among the prime issues to be put on the dialogue agenda’s. 
 
The MENA-region as such is holding large resource potentials, both conventional and 
unconventional. Domestic consumption in the region is however growing rapidly, largely 
driven by the power sector, even leading to gas shortages in some countries. Export 
potentials to the EU therefore are not to be overestimated. EU-relations with the region do 
bring substantial win-win potentials, both in conventional energy but more specifically in 
renewable energy sources. The EU should therefore move in the direction of building and 
further enhancing new and existing institutional frames for political and economic 
cooperation, where energy could be one of the key vectors on which mutual trust and 
confidence could successfully be further developed.  
 
The Caspian Basin with its considerable amount of proven gas reserves could be considered 
as a new frontier for the EU’s gas supplies, further diversifying its resource basis. Direct 
exports to the EU via the Southern Corridor concept would however bring numerous 
geopolitical and infrastructural hurdles that are still being explored with the governments 
that are both directly and indirectly involved. The European Commission is being engaged in 
several dialogues at technical and political levels. The success for the EU in achieving a 
viable flow of gas through the Southern Corridor to EU markets seems to require effective 
and reliable mechanisms for the EU to speak “with one voice” and to act and deliver 
accordingly.  
 
EU gas infrastructures to and through EU markets: EU challenges and external 
relations 
 
Bringing gas to EU- markets is largely coming via pipelines from the North, the North-East, 
the East, the South-East and the South. Policy attention is largely focusing on the South 
Eastern Corridor that should bring gas from the Caspian Basin, and on the South Stream 
project, bringing Russian supplies. On the Caspian issue, a number of more or less 
competing projects are on the table. It may be expected that in the course of 2012 further 
decisions will be made as to the infrastructures to let Caspian gas entering EU markets. 
 
South Stream is a different story, opening a third outlet for Russian supplies in addition to 
the northern route via the new Nord Stream pipelines and the already existing roads from 
Russia via Ukraine and Belorussia. There are however some differences between Nord 
Stream and South Stream, when it comes to ownership2, but more importantly when it 
comes to project definition. North Stream is landing on the EU-border, where it is further 
connected to other pipelines. South Stream is bringing gas through the EU, with a number 
of exits in its transiting EU and non-EU markets. This brings a different and still pending 
regulatory framework, especially in relation to the EUs Third Energy Package. In addition to 
that, the geopolitical dimension in relation to both the Ukrainian route and the competitive 
position vis-à-vis Caspian supplies brings further complexities. The next 1 to 2 years will 
probably be decisive for the whole South-Eastern Corridor and its gas supplies to the South 
Eastern EU market.  
 
When it comes to the internal EU infrastructures for gas, the European Network of 
Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSO-G) has a leading role to play. It is in the 
framework of its new ten-year network development plans (TYNDP) where coordinated 
network development planning at EU and regional levels will be done. Financing and the 
relevant regulatory EU and national regimes are critical factors, not only when it comes to 
risk/reward balances, but also for the various access conditions and capacity allocation 
mechanisms. National regulators and the new ACER will be very instrumental in this regard. 
Similar issues are playing a role in the context of developing storage capacity and receiving 
terminals for LNG. All these issues are not only relevant for the TSOs and the shippers they 
are servicing, but also to a large extent for the EUs external suppliers, as the regulatory 
context will be a critical factor in assessing the overall business cases for securing existing 
and new supplies on a long-term basis.  
 
The regulatory risk as it is perceived by the gas industry, the TSOs, the suppliers, the 
producers inside and outside the EU, will bring a major challenge to regulators and policy 
makers. The Third Energy Package is bringing a huge and ambitious regulatory agenda for a 
wide variety of intra-EU network access and capacity use issues that will further shape the 
internal EU gas market. Its Network Codes and underlying Framework Guidelines need to 
strike a fair and effective balance between the regulatory designs and the role that markets 
are allowed to play. Issues such as crossing border capacity allocation and congestion 
management and their impact on commodity markets and maybe forthcoming (pipeline) 
capacity markets, together with issues around transmission pricing, wholesale markets, spot 
markets, market hubs and their markers for market liquidity and price alignments, allowing 
regional differences wherever feasible, will be determinant factors for maintaining, 
developing and securing competitive gas supplies to EU consumers.  
 
It will be quite clear that all these issues have to be seen in the context of changing market 
conditions, both within the EU and in the more global context of evolving international gas 
markets. Within the EU, the role of gas in the energy equation will be changing, due to the 
EUs ambitious sustainability agenda and the increasing share that intermittent renewable 
energy sources will play in the power generation fuel mix. Gas for power will increase, 
especially in a flexible way, transforming gas more and more into a peak-load fuel, with all 
                                                   
2 NS has a 51% Gazprom-stake, with some major EU industry stakes for the other 49%, whereas SS is a 50/50 venture between Gazprom and (other) EU partners.  
sorts of consequences for the underlying business and market models and calls on 
infrastructure capacities. This will all have impacts on the (continuing) attractiveness of EU 
markets for external gas suppliers. Developing, designing, interpreting and applying these 
new regulatory frameworks require therefore close and transparent consultations with all 
stakeholders inside and outside the EU. Decision making by the relevant EU authorities 
therefore require striking a fair balance between the internal policy agenda and the external 
policy dimensions. The new Architecture should reflect this balance.  
 
Infrastructures and the issue of internal solidarity 
 
Solidarity has proven to be a missing point in European energy policy in the past. Europe has 
experienced a European gas market mainly based on national politics with the “national 
champion” being responsible for securing the supply of each country independently.  
 
The January 2009 gas crisis was only one catalyst that led to making solidarity a priority rather 
than a slogan in the gas security of supply context. Today, besides the fact that the basic 
freedoms of the internal market, such as the free flow of goods and services, etc., are 
guarantors of solidarity and the more specific recent enshrinement of the obligation of the 
Member States to act in a “spirit of solidarity” – referring to the new energy chapter, Article 
194 TFEU – solidarity in gas is translated into concrete action mainly by means of the 
secondary law.  
 
It is, first of all, the gas security of supply Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 that brings a solid 
base for organizing and managing unforeseen supply interruptions on a short-term basis. 
Especially for gas, with its major differences in gas supply structures in the EU, the Regulation 
is the EU-wide solidarity instrument in times of gas shortages.  It is not only the 2009 gas 
crisis, but also earlier and later developments, continuing as recently as winter 2011, that are 
giving important experiences for further refining and improving procedures under the 
Regulation. This articulation and lessons-learned program should continue, without forgetting 
that each crisis has unique characteristics and is, therefore, unpredictable. Certainly, there are 
issues that still need to be resolved or are still missing in the Regulation, one example being 
public service obligations. In particular, the way in which we must manage a public service 
obligation that is in collision with solidarity. For instance, France has a level of public service 
obligation higher than that in the 2010/944 Regulation. That means consumers are more 
protected than the minimum level set up by the Regulation. During a gas crisis, what is the 
right way of dealing with two contradicting obligations? To lighten temporarily this obligation 
in order to allow France to respect its obligation towards all the European countries in gas 
needs? 
 
A second legal tool providing the prerequisite for solidarity being infrastructure and 
interconnections is the European Energy Infrastructure Package. The Regulation on the 
energy infrastructures and the Connecting Europe Facility are measures that address ex ante 
solidarity, to ensure that the EU infrastructure is fit and in good condition in case there should 
be a future crisis. The new infrastructure package is actually, finally after many years, trying to 
address the need to invest, by looking at the common European interests and not just the 
interests of the private companies or even the blind interest of countries.  
 
Another precondition for solidarity is transparency. In this respect, the increased efforts in EU 
foreign energy relations, most recently with the proposal for a Transparency Decision for 
intergovernmental agreements, is a promising step in the right direction. The EU is on a way 
towards solidarity ex ante when it comes to institution building for crisis prevention, as well as 
for ensuring crisis management on the spot in a spirit of solidarity.  
 
The new architecture: recommendations for a new approach  
 
It would seem quite clear that securing supplies needs to be balanced with securing demand, 
and vice versa. The EU’s developing gas demand in the medium and longer terms is largely 
based on the role that market participants are seeing for this fuel in the overall energy mix. 
This role is broadly the result of the energy policies that the EU and the Member States are 
defining and implementing. Energy demand, gas demand and the demand for other energy 
fuels and sources are basically long- term issues. Again, and so is the policy basis. As it is 
clear that the EU has agreed an energy policy framework for the period up to 2020, that is 
implemented at national levels and that for the period beyond 2020 these policies are under 
consideration, it would be very useful to approach the issue for a “new architecture” with 
these timeframes in mind.  
 
For the period up to 2020, energy policy has decided on the role of renewable energy 
sources (RES) in the fuel mix, which gives some indication for the role of gas. With the 
increasing role of RES and maybe other non-fossil fuels for the period beyond 2020, the role 
of gas in the mix and more precisely the role of gas in the system becomes more important, 
exciting and less predictable. Important in the way that new and continuing supply 
arrangements will have to be made, both in terms of commodities and in terms of 
infrastructure capacity. Exciting, as the role of gas in power generation will change, due to its 
potential role of becoming a “flexibility fuel” in relation to the increase of intermittent 
energy sources, and hence the need for changing structures in market and regulatory designs, 
including prices, business models and infrastructure access conditions.  
 
A very clear vision at EU level on these changes would therefore be very appropriate and 
should form an integral part of a new Architecture. The forthcoming discussions on the 
EU’s Road Maps 2050 are presenting useful opportunities. Such a view could also give a 
clear signal to the upstream sector in the value chain, both within the EU but more 
importantly for the EU’s external suppliers. This view could be seen as a basis for further 
developing, focusing and articulating the EU’s external energy relations, energy diplomacy 
and policy in building secure and reliable relations with the EU’s main gas suppliers and 
transport and transit routes.     
 
For the period up to 2020, the policy agenda is focusing on the completion of the internal 
gas market design and the conditions for incentivizing the timely development of the 
necessary infrastructures. For these issues the speedy implementation of the Third Energy 
Package is critical, together with the timely decisions on the actions proposed in the new 
Infrastructure Regulation. A number of relevant issues are still pending, and it would be 
appropriate as well to clear them up without delay in order to give more clarity to all market 
parties in the value chain, including the EU’s external suppliers. 
 
A new EU Architecture for securing the EU’s gas supply basis in the medium and longer 
terms should very well reflect the issues mentioned above. Special attention should be given 
to the 2050 Energy Road Map, as the policy discussions therein could be considered the 
global and integrated EU view on the longer-term energy mix with due regard to the 
transition towards a low-carbon energy economy. In addition, policy discussion and 
implementation are also relevant for gas supply security in the context of the EU’s external 
energy policy. As a third consideration, the more medium-term agenda of “completing” the 
EU’s internal gas market shall be mentioned.  
 
With respect to the new architecture, it is strongly recommended to make a distinction 
between a longer-term focus, i.e. on the post 2020 period and a shorter/medium term focus, 
i.e. on the period up to 2020. For both periods it is recommended to define a clear and 
articulated policy vision. 
 
 
The long-term vision 
 
The long-term vision should cover three specific policy chapters: the role of gas in the 
energy fuel mix and energy system, the EU external energy policy focus and the EU internal 
gas market. 
 
The role of gas 
 
Security of supply and security of demand are two sides of the same coin. Building market 
confidence in the long-term is essential for both upstream and downstream investments and 
market signals. The EU should therefore develop a clear vision of the role it sees for gas in 
its global energy mix as part of the 2050 Roadmap. A choice should be made whether gas 
will (again) be a “fuel of destination”, i.e. the fuel that gives in the medium and longer-term 
the most cost-effective and sustainable solution? Or will gas rather be considered as a “fuel 
of transition”, i.e. the primary fuel that would help the EU on its road towards the carbon-
free energy economy? Or, finally, will gas be considered as a “fuel of consequence”, i.e. the 
fallback option should other options fail to deliver at the necessary times? 
 
In any scenario on the role of gas in the energy system, the interaction between the gas and 
power sectors will need to grow dramatically. That would mean that gas demand would 
become more and more a function of the power generating systems, due to its large 
advantages as a flexible fuel. In addition, new innovative concepts of gas-to-power and 
power-to-gas interactions, including the application of electrolysis and storage technologies, 
will bring further options for the use of gas in the energy system. This changing role of gas 
will have no doubt dramatic consequences for the use of the gas-infrastructures 
(transmission and storage), with changing business models and increasing spot-oriented 
intra-EU trade. Market designs and regulatory designs will have to be reconsidered and the 
interaction between the power market and the various fuel markets, including the carbon 
market will increase as well. If Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) is to be applied at larger 
scales, fine-tuning between the gas and power chains with the carbon chain would become a 
further challenge. A new gas supply architecture should reflect on these developments in 
order to enhance supplier confidence and consumer needs. 
 
The external energy policy focus 
 
External energy relations at the EU level, especially when external gas supplies are involved, 
should be built upon the vision mentioned in the first paragraph, and should lead to specific 
strategies for the EU’s main suppliers. Taking due account of the developing global gas 
markets, focus should be put on, respectively, Norway, Russia, the Mediterranean region and 
the Caspian Basin. For each of these, it would be appropriate to create a specific mechanism 
for periodic discussion, review and institutionalized approaches regarding gas supplies and 
related relevant policy issues.   
 
As examples, the northern dimension could include the development of market structures 
and business models and could also give due account on the role of hydro as a storage 
option for managing intermittent energy sources, as well as the schemes for deploying large 
scale CCS. The eastern dimension should focus on the issue of mutual “win-win” schemes 
for applying reciprocity criteria in both the upstream and downstream segments of the value-
chain. Equally important would be the issues regarding East-West transit-lines on the way to 
and through EU-markets, and eventually, the enhancement of the early warning systems in 
the case of supply interruptions.  
 
The southern dimension could focus in a broader way on economic cooperation, including 
energy issues. Changing geo-political structures in the region might bring new opportunities 
for using the wide variety of EU instruments. Global political cooperation in the 
Mediterranean region, including on renewable energy such as the Desertec project and the 
relating Medgrid or Medreg initiatives might bring new momentum. The SE-EU dimension 
and its strategic energy pathways between the East and the South would bring further 
options for the EU, building, where necessary, on the Energy Community Treaty-
framework, and could also include the ways and means of innovative gas purchasing 
schemes.    
 
The internal EU gas market 
 
The EU should strive to remain, for all external suppliers and for all of the three possible 
visions on the role of gas, an attractive market for suppliers. The internal market model 
should reflect, therefore, the changing market structures and conditions that will need to 
develop from the broader vision of the role of gas. For instance, the emergence of gas as a 
fuel for delivering flexibility and back-up in the increasingly RES-dominated power systems 
may have serious consequences for the prevailing gas market and regulatory designs. As part 
of the architecture, the EU should consider redefining its vision on the internal gas market, 
and remaining open to suggestions from its main external suppliers.    
 
This changing role of gas will have a particularly precise and challenging impact regarding 
issues that go beyond national authorities and policy-making: short-term and spot trades will 
need to increase to manage flexible market demand; cross-border exchanges will further 
develop; and cross-border arbitrages in the gas/electricity/carbon market dimensions will 
have to develop (relying more frequently on short-term capacity requirements in pipelines 
and interconnections, with resulting capacity (under)use and allocations). Transits will be an 
expanded, normal way of moving gas through EU-markets, and infrastructure access and 
pricing will need to accommodate these flows. Storage will become more important, 
managing seasonal variations as well as much shorter-term daily or weekly variations.   
 
For these and other issues, effective cross-border regulatory oversight and designs will need 
to be developed further, perhaps more on regional levels then for the EU as a whole. A 
more articulated and defined view on the post-2020 EU gas market should be an essential 
element of the EU’s supply architecture regardless of whether gas stays in the fuel mix for 
the next two to three generations or whether it is used solely as a back-up fuel in case other 
generating technologies do not deliver. 
 
 
The short-term vision 
 
The short-term vision should equally cover three policy chapters: the Infrastructure Package 
implementation, the (expedited) implementation of the Third Energy Package, and the fine-
tuning of the concept of solidarity. The implementation of these two Packages requires 
timely decision-making for full application since the window-of-opportunity for the cost-
effective transition to a low carbon energy economy is anticipated to close around 2018. The 
long-term vision for the role of gas could be less meaningful if not supported by the short-
term actions that are required. Short-term actions are therefore considered as the first step to 
moving beyond 2020. In addition, a further enhancement of the existing emergency 
mechanism would result in a strengthening of solidarity within the EU and, thus, contribute 
to global supply security.        
    
The European Energy Infrastructure Package 
 
New investments in long-haul and cross-border pipelines for gas are critical components of 
any supply Architecture. The Infrastructure Package covers a number of issues that call for 
timely implementation: enhancing the Project of Common Interest (PCI) process; 
streamlining the Cross-Border Cost-Benefit Analysis (CB-CBA) approach; expediting 
efficient CB-licensing and permitting; and specifying the role of public money versus private 
money.  The three EU institutions should therefore work expeditiously on a decision on the 
Regulation, allowing it to enter into force as early as 2013. In addition, the various 
implementing devices, such as CBA-methodologies and arrangements for CB-regulatory 
decisions could start as soon as 2012 if prioritization by the Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators (ACER) is allowed and facilitated.  
 
The Third Energy Package 
 
The Third Energy Package is a solid basis for organizing the EU gas market and the TSO 
industry. Implementation does not yet have the proper priority at the national level, which 
influences the work at EU-level. The process of establishing the Network Codes and the 
supporting Framework Guidelines should further facilitate a timely completion with some 
further political guidance, if necessary, by the Council. Refraining from addressing minutiae 
would streamline this process.   
 
The ongoing cross-border restructuring process in the TSO-sector, which could be 
considered as a positive step towards further market integration, may require additional 
attention in order to manage an effective and supportive TSO-certification process. Once 
again, ACER plays an important preparatory role, especially when it comes to further 
strengthening the cooperation of National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs). 
 
Securing regulatory stability to allow the necessary market dynamics deserves continued 
attention by all stakeholders and authorities. The ongoing Regional Gas Initiatives (RGI) and 
other informal discussion platforms have roles to play in seeking specific solutions for 
regionally specific issues. If these mechanisms are working effectively, an EU-wide model 
for an internal gas market would become less urgent. 
 
High-level attention is needed and should be given to the two issues that are of significant 
concern to some of the EU’s external suppliers. The relevant conditions in the Third 
Package, i.e. on non-EU ownership in infrastructures and on efficient cross-border transiting 
of gas flows, should be further articulated and discussed with external suppliers at the proper 
levels. These issues can, and should, be solved over the course of the next year or so.      
 
The building of energy solidarity in the EU 
 
The EU is on a promising path towards the building of EU energy solidarity both ex ante, 
when it comes to institution building for crisis prevention, and on the spot, in terms of crisis 
management in a spirit of solidarity. 
 
Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply is the 
EU’s key solidarity instrument providing a solid basis for the management of unforeseen 
supply interruptions on a short -term basis. Certain issues that still need to be resolved or are 
missing can be overcome based on the experiences from past crises. The transposition of the 
lessons learnt into the existing framework can further refine and improve the procedure in 
place. 
 
Ultimately, the prerequisite to solidarity is transparency. In this respect the increased efforts in 
the area of foreign energy relations with supplier countries play an important role. Following 
the long awaited Communication of the EC in September 2011 here especially the proposal 
for a Decision setting up an information exchange mechanism with regard to 
intergovernmental agreements between Member States and third countries in the field of 
energy is a promising step in the right direction. 
 
